Guyana’s oil boom is widely celebrated as a national success story, but analysts warn that the reality is far more complex, with the United States (U.S).-linked firms controlling the bulk of production and influencing key fiscal and operational decisions. According to political and global strategist Pearce Robinson, the U.S holds economic and operational dominance over roughly 75 percent of Guyana’s producing oil sector, with 100 percent of current production flowing from a single U.S.-dominated consortium.
The Stabroek Block, which produces more than 900,000 barrels per day, is operated by ExxonMobil with a 45 percent stake, partnered by Hess at 30 percent — now controlled by Chevron — and China’s CNOOC at 25 percent. While legal title remains with the Guyanese state under the Production Sharing Agreement (PSA), Robinson notes that “this ownership structure concentrates capital control, development decisions, and operational authority overwhelmingly in U.S.-linked hands.”
Under the 2016 Stabroek PSA, Guyana receives a mere 2 percent royalty and allows up to 75 percent of gross revenues to be recovered first by the companies as costs, with only the remainder split 50/50. Corporate taxes are drawn from Guyana’s share rather than remitted directly. Robinson, in a social media post explains that “the structure ensures most revenue is absorbed and expatriated before profits ever reach the state,” leaving the country with limited immediate fiscal benefit.
By comparison, early post-independence Trinidad and Tobago applied crude oil royalties in the 10–12.5 percent range, capturing a materially larger upfront state take. While geological and risk factors differed, Robinson argues that Guyana’s arrangement back-loads benefits, heavily favoring operators and delaying national gains. For nearly a decade, media, civil society, and international watchdogs have documented that the Stabroek terms favour operators through low royalties, opaque cost recovery, delayed audits, environmental exposure, and constrained fiscal upside.
“The government has defended the agreement at every stage, rejected renegotiation, and elevated contract sanctity above national leverage,” Robinson wrote. No other block produces oil at scale, and the Stabroek structure ensures that much of the revenue is expatriated rather than circulating domestically. Robinson adds that while some development is occurring, it is “real but slow, uneven, and tightly constrained for ordinary Guyanese.”
Robinson contrasts this with U.S. actions in Venezuela, where Washington exerts direct pressure through sanctions, tanker seizures, and preferential licensing arrangements. In Guyana, however, he writes, “the same strategic outcome is achieved without confrontation,” as the neutralization of Venezuela’s territorial claims over the Essequibo region removed the primary geopolitical threat to U.S. oil operations. Guyana’s reliance on U.S. diplomatic and security power effectively embeds American dominance in the regional energy order.
“This arrangement is, in substance, a modern extraction regime: legal, contractual, and geopolitical control exercised by a foreign power over a sovereign country’s most valuable resource,” Robinson concluded. The result, he says, is an oil sector “shaped overwhelmingly by U.S.-linked interests, a government bound by agreements it cannot amend, and a country generating vast revenues while steadily surrendering leverage over its own future.”
Robinson’s commentary echoes warnings made nine years ago by economist Bahamian Ambassador Professor Gilbert Morris, who cautioned that “Guyana will be poorer after oil than before it,” adding that “the people who ruined Guyana are now in charge of its one chance at property for all.” Morris further warned that “the oil contracts are so poorly drawn that Exxon must laugh at the stupidity of the negotiators,” and predicted that “the long suffering people of Guyana will pay the price.”
Morris also criticised the country’s geopolitical positioning, noting that “when Nicolás Maduro incurred into Guyanese territory, [he] advised: DO NOT PARTNER WITH THE US AGAINST VENEZUELA…because it would give them a foothold between Exxon in Guyana and Shell in Venezuela and they will strike a deal with US government in their favour!” He lamented that “foolishly, CARICOM and Guyana allowed the U.S. that foothold: THE END!”
See Robinson’s opinion below
75% U.S. CONTROL, 2% ROYALTY: HOW GUYANA LOST LEVERAGE OVER ITS OWN OIL — AND WHY WASHINGTON NOW HOLDS THE CARDS
By Pearce Robinson
Guyana’s oil boom is routinely celebrated as a national success story, but the hard numbers tell a far more uncomfortable truth: the United States holds economic and operational dominance over roughly 75% of Guyana’s producing oil sector, and 100% of current production flows from a single U.S.-dominated consortium.
The Stabroek Block, the source of all of Guyana’s ~900,000+ barrels per day is operated by ExxonMobil with a 45% stake, partnered by Hess at 30%, a stake now controlled by Chevron following its acquisition of Hess, alongside China’s CNOOC at 25%. This ownership structure concentrates capital control, development decisions, and operational authority overwhelmingly in U.S.-linked hands, even as legal title remains with the Guyanese state under the Production Sharing Agreement.
Under the 2016 Stabroek PSA, Guyana receives just a 2% royalty, allows up to 75% of gross revenues to be taken first as cost recovery, and only then splits what remains 50/50, with corporate income taxes deemed paid but drawn from Guyana’s share rather than remitted by the companies themselves. There is no additional royalty or hidden percentage elsewhere in the deal; the structure ensures most revenue is absorbed and expatriated before profits ever reach the state.
That 2% royalty is historically aberrant. In the early post-independence period, Trinidad and Tobago applied crude oil royalties commonly in the 10%–12.5% range within a broader concessionary tax system, securing a materially larger upfront state take at the very beginning of its petroleum era than Guyana receives today. While the fiscal architectures differed and basin risks were not identical, Trinidad’s model nonetheless captured a higher share of gross value from the outset.
By contrast, Guyana’s PSA back-loads national benefit by design. For nearly a decade, Guyanese media, civil society, and international watchdogs have documented that the Stabroek terms overwhelmingly favor operators through low effective royalties, opaque cost recovery, delayed audits, environmental exposure, and constrained fiscal upside. The government has defended the agreement at every stage, rejected renegotiation, and elevated contract sanctity above national leverage. No other block produces oil at scale. While many assume Guyana is becoming wealthy because of the scale of investment, the structure ensures that a large share of oil revenues is expatriated rather than circulating domestically, producing development that is real but slow, uneven, and tightly constrained for ordinary Guyanese. Guyana’s oil economy operates under contractual and capital dominance secured through preferential access rather than overt force.
Washington applies direct, coercive pressure in Venezuela while exercising contractual and geopolitical dominance in Guyana. In Venezuela, the U.S. state has seized tankers, enforced sanctions, restricted and displaced Chinese and Russian participation, and channelled production through preferential U.S. licensing arrangements, including carve-outs for selected American firms.
These actions constitute state power applied directly to oil flows. In Guyana, the same strategic outcome is achieved without confrontation. The neutralisation of Venezuela’s long-standing territorial claim over the Essequibo region removed the primary geopolitical threat to U.S. oil operations in Guyana and secured control over oil-rich waters central to the Stabroek development. Guyana, lacking the capacity to independently counter Venezuelan pressure, relies on U.S. diplomatic and security power to enforce that outcome. This reliance embeds American dominance into the regional energy order while Venezuela absorbs overt coercion.
The United States already holds what it sought in Guyana: energy dominance without confrontation, control without negotiation, and preferential access without resistance. This reflects a broader hemispheric pattern force where resistance exists, contracts where it does not. The only marginal positive is that this arrangement suppresses immediate regional conflict and provides Guyana short-term security.
What this arrangement is, in substance, is a modern extraction regime: legal, contractual, and geopolitical control exercised by a foreign power over a sovereign country’s most valuable resource. The result is an oil sector shaped overwhelmingly by U.S.-linked interests, a government bound by agreements it cannot amend, and a country generating vast revenues while steadily surrendering leverage over its own future.
