Politics and governance in Guyana over the past year were entirely dominated by national elections, which in turn were dominated by the rise of the new political party, We Invest In Nationhood (WIN), financed by the Mohammeds. Post elections politics, in turn, have also been dominated by the Mohammeds, specifically how to extradite them before they can tell their side of their relationship with the ruling party. This single-minded search for a political rather than a legal solution to the Mohammeds has required Byzantine levels of legal and judicial irregularities, postponement of the Parliament, and meddling with the tax system in order to favour extradition rather than a domestic trial.
Operations of the new Parliament have been postponed for months to avoid swearing in of Azruddin Mohammed, the leader of WIN, as Leader of the Opposition. Non-appointment and its knock-on effects for all matters requiring consultation with the Opposition Leader is the most glaring instance of shrinking political space in Guyana since the current Constitution was introduced in 1980, to provide legal cover to the dictatorial powers accumulated in the person of President Burnham. Mansion-building appears to be the only permitted distraction from the Mohammeds saga, for the upper echelon of the ruling party.
While avoidance of calling Parliament has generated criticism across all Parliamentary parties, no united strategy has yet emerged to counter this major infraction. Opposition parties seem focused on a range of party priorities rather than subordinate them to re-convening Parliament.
The failure of the opposition political parties to rally together around the pivotal issue of a prolonged suspension of Parliament sets the scene for future uses of this tactic whenever a ruling party finds it convenient. Moreover, none of the issues opposition parties are embracing – the Natural Resources Fund, corruption, women’s rights, for example – can be addressed in isolation. They all need a parliamentary opposition to be unified.
While shrinking political space has been underscored more dramatically by the suspension of Parliament the contraction process itself has been steadily implemented since 2020. The Parliamentary Public Accounts Committee, chaired by the Opposition, for example, has been stalled from meeting by the ruling party raising the quorum needed for a meeting to take place, then ensuring the failure of the ruling party members to attend. The catalogue of offences to the Representation of the Peoples Act documented in the EU Elections Report tell a tale of systematic contraction of political space. Non-confirmation of a range of key office-holders such as Chief Justice and Chancellor confer illegitimate powers in the Presidency. The political independence of the Guyana Police Force has been fatally undermined by party manipulation of appointments.
Unrelenting reduction of civic space for civic bodies to participate in public life without fear of retaliation has mirrored reduction of political space over the past five years. However, this process has sharply accelerated in recent months. Replacing the civic component of the Guyana Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (GYEITI) by the Private Sector Commission (PSC) constitutes, for civil society, what the Mohammed saga represents in the political sector – namely, the most high-profile example of institutional contraction of civic space. GYEITI Reports must now be read as Government-approved, rather than independent publications.
Authoritarianism and growing constraints on civil society space is by far the biggest challenge facing the society since it also fosters growing discontent with representative democracy. In response, focusing on the larger narrative of shrinking space, rather than simply contesting specific additional examples of abuse is an urgent national priority. It is a response required from both political and especially civil society. One strength in this general area of weakness that needs to be recognized is the systemic and inter-related nature of the crises facing Guyana, namely climate, food, equality and corruption crises. Over-all, the impact of autocratic influence must encourage campaigning organizations to tackle such injustices more holistically and to address their shared root causes more systemically.
How to galvanize higher levels of collective governance action within civil society, including the broader professional, philanthropic, sports, cultural and religious bodies, as well as NGO advocacy organizations, is the first step. This implies that civil society avoid the dilemma in which opposition political organizations find themselves, namely, focusing on specific troubling facts, rather than the over-all problematic governance framework supporting individual abuses.
Without collective action on clear and glaring institutional abuse how can Guyana hope to confront the real political challenges facing the societies, such as the plundering of natural resources; reparations; monetary and inheritance inequalities; seeking electoral and media systems that cannot be controlled by money.
