The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has hailed Guyana’s 2025 General and Regional Elections as one of the most transparent, credible, and professionally managed elections in the country’s modern history. Yet this sweeping praise appears at odds with multiple structural, legal, and operational shortcomings documented by independent observers and civil society, casting doubt on the UNDP’s assessment.
Sections 96 and 99 of the Representation of the People Act (ROPA) set clear legal obligations for the Guyana Elections Commission (GECOM) in certifying election results.
Section 96 requires the Chief Election Officer to “ascertain the result of the election” based on verified votes and prepare a report in both manual and electronic form, which then serves as “the basis for the Commission to declare and publish the election results under section 99.”
Section 99 further mandates that “as soon as practicable, but not later than fifteen days after election day, the Commission shall publicly declare the results of the election and cause to be published in the Gazette a notification thereof, specifying the number of votes cast for each list of candidates, the number of rejected ballot papers, the number of seats allocated to each list of candidates, and the names of the persons who have become members of the National Assembly.”
Opposition-nominated Commissioners have repeatedly pointed out that GECOM bypassed these critical stages, moving directly to gazette the results on September 16, 2025. Even the gazetted figures contained glaring errors, such as identical vote totals—9,938—for the People’s Progressive Party/Civic (PPP/C) in Regions 9 and 10. The official declaration, signed by GECOM Chief Election Officer Vishnu Persaud, raises serious questions about compliance with Sections 96 and 99, which are designed to ensure both accuracy and transparency.
The UNDP credited technical assistance funded by the United Kingdom for enabling GECOM to carry out a highly effective electoral process. According to the UNDP, its support “reinforced GECOM’s role as a trusted guardian of Guyana’s democratic values,” adding that “engagement with diverse stakeholders fostered inclusivity and dialogue, while the technical assistance implemented ensured credibility and public confidence.”
The agency also highlighted GECOM’s development of a Communications Strategy, Branding Manual, and Crisis Communication Protocol, as well as training for more than 100 journalists and initiatives to strengthen inclusion for persons with disabilities.
Yet the UNDP’s portrayal of a high-functioning electoral apparatus contrasts sharply with independent reports. The European Union Election Observation Mission (EU-EOM) highlighted structural weaknesses, including a bloated voters list, the absence of biometric verification, and the eligibility of Commonwealth citizens not domiciled in Guyana—long-flagged risks for potential manipulation. Delays, gaps in information flow, and inconsistent media access also undermine the UNDP’s claim that GECOM’s Communications Strategy and Crisis Communication Protocol were fully operational.
Beyond these concerns, the electoral process was marred by a compromised work plan and a voters list riddled with anomalies, including deceased individuals still registered. These flaws, combined with GECOM’s disregard for Sections 96 and 99, point to systemic lapses that cannot be mitigated by logistical efficiency or international support alone.
Commentators argue that operational improvements—such as the management of 2,790 polling stations, deployment of 13,925 officials, and cybersecurity enhancements—do not substitute for compliance with the legal framework intended to safeguard electoral integrity.
Civil society groups underscore that credibility depends not only on procedural execution but on systems that prevent fraud, ensure voter authentication, and adhere to statutory requirements. For them, the UNDP’s emphasis on “institutional credibility” is misleading, suggesting that elections can be deemed fully transparent even when foundational legal and integrity safeguards are ignored.
Parliament, political parties, and oversight bodies are preparing for post-election review, yet a critical question persists: do administrative improvements alone constitute electoral credibility if foundational legal requirements are bypassed? Sections 96 and 99 of ROPA mandate proper verification and certification of results, which GECOM failed to implement. Coupled with a bloated voters list, non-functional biometric safeguards, and other anomalies, these gaps raise serious doubts about the legitimacy of declaring the 2025 elections among the “most credible” in Guyana’s history.
The gap between the UNDP’s glowing assessment and the documented shortcomings highlights a deeper tension within the electoral process. International support may improve logistics, communication, and operational efficiency, but genuine electoral credibility rests on adherence to the law, rigorous voter verification, and safeguards capable of ensuring results that withstand scrutiny. For many stakeholders, the integrity of Guyana’s 2025 elections remains an open and unresolved question.
