A striking feature of the Mohammed saga is that each stage appears to have been initiated by the United States Government, with local law enforcement in reactive mode, as if Guyana were not a sovereign State. This pattern was reinforced by the Attorney-General’s announcement on 3 November 2025 of more extraditions in the near future[i], as if he were just a post-box.
The charges against the Mohammeds all relate to evasion of duties owed to the Guyana Government, not the USA, on over USD 50 million worth of gold exports. The alleged crimes occurred in Guyana, and the Mohammeds lived in Guyana throughout the period in question. Yet, over the period these events allegedly occurred (2019-2023)[ii], there is no evidence of any proactive effort by the Guyana Government to investigate or prosecute them.
This USA-led approach masks a critical issue: the Mohammeds could not have executed the alleged schemes alone. Who else in the government Ministries and bureaucracy colluded in this long-standing operation, and why has the Government of Guyana not charged anyone else? The Mohammeds would have needed assistance in securing bogus licences, permissions, firearms, and in perpetrating tax evasion. The USA recognized this by also sanctioning Ms. Mae Thomas, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs, who “misused her position …to offer benefits to Mohamed’s Enterprise and Azruddin in exchange for cash payments and high-value gifts”[iii]. Even so, Ms. Thomas alone could not account for all the collusion implied by the scale of the charges levied against Nazar and Azruddin Mohammed.
This raises the central domestic question: “But what about the others?” Since the US sanctions were imposed, no action has been taken against alleged collaborators in Guyana who facilitated the illegal export of massive amounts of gold. GRA charges against the Mohammeds for unpaid income taxes may be legally valid, but their timing – coinciding with the ruling party’s anxiety over the Mohammed’s political influence – is tainted.
From a domestic perspective, the political dimension of the Mohammed saga has overshadowed the criminal. Once considered influential allies of the ruling PPP, bankrolling their 2020 electoral victory, importing high-end cars without paying taxes, and with the senior Mohammed even winning a seat in 2023 on the Eccles/Ramsburg, East Bank Demerara Neighbourhood Democratic Council (NDC) as a PPP candidate[iv], the family’s wealth appears closely tied to political association.
Extradition efforts were widely interpreted as attempts to prevent the younger Mohammed from becoming Leader of the Parliamentary Opposition, following the ruling party’s frantic attempts to curtail the political rise of the Mohammeds during the September 2025 national elections. This perplexed many Guyanese and ironically, increased public sympathy for them.
Beyond political maneuvering, the case raises concerns over domestic accountability. Reducing the complex problem of illegal gold exports and international smuggling solely to the Mohammeds ignores broader systemic failures. Attempts to link them to anti-national activity via the Venezuelan embassy has further politicized and distracted from the core issues of sovereignty and governance.
The arrest itself, carried out on 31 October 2025, resembled a theatrical spectacle. On a public street in Georgetown, police wearing full head-covers reminiscent of ICE operations in the US, forcibly arrested and handcuffed Azruddin Mohammed, despite his publicly-stated willingness to comply with extradition procedures. Frustrated by repeated granting of bail to Azruddin Mohamed[v], one PPP lawyer now seeks to challenge bail as unconstitutional in this latest instance, an argument devoid of legal merit. Article 139(1) of Guyana’s Constitution clearly grants magistrates discretion, rather than obliging them to impose restrictions on freedom, with extradition-related detention being a low-priority category.
Finally, the Mohammed case underscores the importance of context in extradition proceedings. While the principle of global justice for serious crimes is commendable, the circumstances and domestic implications of charges must be considered. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) guidance emphasizes careful handling of extradition, especially when it involves prominent State figures. In Guyana, however, respect for State institutions is often subordinated to political expediency. Guyana’s low prioritization of illegal gold exports in general – as evidenced by the need for USA sanctions to spur local legal action – highlights the systemic nature of this problem. Without commenting on the content of the case, or the guilt of the Mohammeds, this case should clearly be approached with a wider range of suspects in mind if serving the national, rather than partisan interests, is the ultimate goal.
[i] https://www.stabroeknews.com/2025/11/03/news/guyana/more-extradition-requests-expected-next-week-ag/
[ii] https://2021-2025.state.gov/imposing-sanctions-on-corrupt-actors-in-guyana/
[iii] https://2021-2025.state.gov/imposing-sanctions-on-corrupt-actors-in-guyana/
[iv] Stabroek News. (2024, June 21). Nazar Mohamed resigns as Eccles/Ramsburg councillor. Stabroek News. https://www.stabroeknews.com/2024/06/21/news/guyana/nazar-mohamed-resigns-as-eccles-ramsburg-councillor/
