By Renwell Cunningham, Political Analyst
Henry Kissinger once confided to William F. Buckley, “It may be dangerous to be America’s enemy, but to be America’s friend is fatal.” It is a phrase that should weigh heavily on Guyana’s leadership as Venezuela escalates its territorial ambitions, making bold and aggressive claims to parts of Guyana’s sovereign land.
President Irfaan Ali, however, appears to place significant faith in U.S. assurances, believing Washington will stand firmly behind Guyana. But the real question remains: At what cost? And will that support come when it truly matters?
The United States has a mixed track record when it comes to defending allies. The Monroe Doctrine was once a clear warning against foreign interference in the Western Hemisphere, but in modern times, its application has been inconsistent.
- In 1983, the U.S. swiftly intervened in Grenada, citing national security concerns.
- In 1989, the U.S. invaded Panama to remove Manuel Noriega, a former U.S. ally turned adversary.
- In Haiti (1994, 2004), the U.S. intervened militarily and diplomatically, but with shifting political priorities.
Yet, when allies no longer serve U.S. interests, the response can be drastically different. The Afghan government collapsed overnight in 2021 after two decades of U.S. backing, and Ukraine now faces waning U.S. support as political divisions take hold in Washington.
Ukraine is now experiencing the limits of U.S. commitment. Donald Trump’s recent and very public comments about letting Russia “take” parts of Ukraine have undermined Kyiv’s confidence in long-term U.S. backing. If a European democracy actively fighting a war against a U.S. adversary can see its support waver, Guyana must question how reliable Washington’s assurances truly are.
Former U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo recently wrote on social media:
“America First means not letting thugs like Venezuela’s Maduro put American interests at risk and violate Guyana’s sovereignty.”
But there’s one problem, Pompeo holds no power in the current administration. He has been politically sidelined, and his influence in Washington is now negligible. Guyana’s leadership may find comfort in such statements, but they do not reflect the position of the U.S. government today.
And with a growing isolationist sentiment in U.S. politics, an increasing number of Americans question whether they should continue funding foreign conflicts at all.
One Trump supporter’s comment on Pompeo’s social media post captured this sentiment:
“We don’t want to pay for Ukraine, what makes you think we want to sink those costs into Guyana? WE THE PEOPLE are DONE being the world’s ATM.”
Meanwhile, Venezuela’s aggression is escalating. Nicolás Maduro’s regime has officially laid claim to Guyana’s Essequibo region, and recent reports indicate that Venezuelan forces have crossed into Guyanese territory. Despite this clear provocation, the global response has been muted.
Unlike Ukraine, which has NATO, the European Union, and the U.S. directly involved, Guyana’s support from global powers has been inconsistent.
- The United States has issued warnings to Venezuela, but has not made firm military commitments.
- China has remained silent, prioritizing its close economic ties with both Guyana and Venezuela.
- Russia openly supports Venezuela’s claims, complicating diplomatic efforts.
- The European Union and the United Kingdom have not taken strong, public positions.
If war were to break out, who would defend Guyana?, especially since the PPP have underfunded the majority African Guyana Defense Force, refused to invest in any meaningful weaponry, all the while striping the force of any talented leadership.
If Venezuela escalates further, would the Trump administration, or a future democrat administration, truly risk American lives to defend a small South American nation? Or would Washington calculate its own interests first, just as it has done in Ukraine, Taiwan, and Afghanistan?
Even if the U.S. were to intervene, what price would Guyana be expected to pay?
The United States rarely extends military support without strings attached. If Guyana were to become the recipient of American defense aid, it would almost certainly come with conditions, greater U.S. influence over Guyana’s vast oil wealth, security agreements that favor American corporations, and possible military basing rights.
Would Guyana trade Venezuelan pressure for American control?
If history is any guide, Guyana cannot afford to be naïve. The Monroe Doctrine no longer guarantees U.S. intervention, and unless Venezuela’s aggression directly threatens American interests, Guyana may not receive the support it expects.
For now, Guyana’s best hope lies not in blind faith in Washington but in strategic alliance-building. President Irfaan Ali must take a page from Ukraine’s Volodymyr Zelensky, he cannot simply pick up the phone and hope for diplomatic favors. Instead, he must get on a plane and personally engage world leaders, plead Guyana’s case, and secure tangible commitments of support.
However, Ali faces a unique challenge that Zelensky did not, Guyana is newly rich oil-rich and perceived to be led by corrupt officials, and every nation he turns to will be looking for a share of the profits. The Ali administration now stands at a political crossroads, this is not the time for corrupt deal-making, partisan infighting, or PPP-style political maneuvering.
If Ali is serious about securing Guyana’s future, he must form a nonpartisan national security strategy, bring in the best minds across the political divide, and position Guyana as a strong, self-sufficient player on the world stage. And above all, Ali must remember, Washington’s promises are often contingent, transactional, and fleeting. Because if Venezuela moves more aggressively, Guyana may soon find itself in the same position as Ukraine, waiting for U.S. help that may never come.
