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Last week in the ‘The roots of Jagan’s National Patriotic Front’ (VV: 25/08/2024. KN: 26/08/2024), I argued that notwithstanding the clearly dysfunctional nature of Guyana’s political system, arriving at an appropriate consensual solution will be extremely controversial not least because entrenched ethnic interests are co-mingling with oligarchic party and individual interests. Ethnic alienation is daily becoming worse as the present autocratic PPP government frantically tries to force Africans into its ranks.
Mind you, contrary to what some think, the struggle in Guyana is not between democracy and autocracy (‘Guyana precariously poised between democracy and autocracy – Ramcharan’. SN; 30/08/2024): it is between democracy and an ‘ethnic autocracy’, more akin to the situation in Israel but with even less justification for masquerading as a democracy!
Public accountability is the lynchpin of democratic government and in liberal democracies in the final analysis this is accomplished by way of a sufficient united public opinion. This is why, for example, the autocracy in Guyana is fundamentally different from that in Venezuela, where such an opinion can materialise and must, therefore, be continually suppressed. Guyana does not have an adequate public opinion to hold governments accountable.
For decades, two large political hostile ethnic groups and their political parties have equally divided about 80% of the voting population. Of course, rather than being accused of attempting to establish an apartheid state, the PPP would much prefer its behaviour to appear as the normal wickedness of an autocracy because this would not only facilitate the normalisation of its behaviour internally but also allow greater international access, as those involved in race/ethnic discrimination are now frowned upon even by autocratic governments.
But acts such as designing national budgets to benefit your ethnic group and suppress the other side to drive them into your camp, as is clearly the case with he present PPP government in relation to public servants, including teachers who are largely Africans, is not furtively achievable in the present global communications context.
When such a political environment exists, the only democratic answer is shared governance: a form of democratic governance that shares national executive and legislative power between ethnic groups to allow them to be able to protect their interests from the kind of executive abuse that is rampant in Guyana.
Shared governance is not about the majority party sharing its power with minority parties and must, therefore, be adequately structured. Briefly for example, by the Northern Ireland Good Friday Agreement, national executive authority is constitutionally shared on an equal basis between the first and deputy first ministers who belong to different ethnic groups. The majority and minority ethnic parties respectively nominate them; they are appointed by the legislature and co-chair and agree upon the agenda of the national executive/government.
President Jimmy Carter left Guyana in 2004 bemoaning the fact that the PPP “takes full advantage of the ‘ancient winner take all’ system in Guyana” and did not return until 2011, when the PNC-led coalition promised to establish shared governance but did not do so when it came to government in 2015. Immediately upon coming to government, the present United States administration, continuing the process that began under its predecessor, has been calling upon the political elites in Guyana to ‘reform the winner-takes-all political system and establish an effective democracy’. However, using undemocratic methods that have established why power-sharing is necessary, the PPP is seeking to demonstrate that it is unnecessary!
I promised to deal today with the specific shared governance proposal suggested by Mr. Ralph Ramkarran (‘A review of shared governance and what it could look like’. SN/11/08/2024). He began by stating that, ‘To advance the shared governance project, I now offer possible amendments to the Constitution to give effect to what it could potentially look like’.
Ralph suggests that article 101(1) of the Constitution be amended to read: ‘The President shall appoint an elected member of the National Assembly, who has been named as the presidential candidate of the List receiving the second largest number of votes at the elections, to be the Prime Minister of Guyana. Provided that if there is no such elected member, or if such elected member declines by act or omission to accept appointment as Prime Minister of Guyana within two weeks, the President shall appoint any elected member of his choice’.
And he suggests that article 103(2) be amended to provide that ‘Subject to the provisions of article 101(1) other Ministers shall be appointed by the President from among persons who are elected members of the National Assembly. Such other Ministers shall be limited in number to fifteen and shall be appointed from the Lists obtaining the highest and second highest number of votes in proportion to such votes after consultation between the President and Prime Minister.’
As noted above, it is the executive authority that needs to be reformed and article 99 of the Constitution states that ‘The executive authority of Guyana shall be vested in the President and, subject to the provisions of this Constitution, may be exercised by him either directly or through officers subordinate to him.’ This executive president and his party are elected by way of a pluralistic majoritarian system that Mr. Ramkarran appears to have left unchanged.
Indeed, among other things, the prime minister is appointed by the president from the party obtaining the second largest number of votes, without any statement of how he will determine which member to appoint, and there is a strong suggestion that the PM is subordinated to the president and all that that could entail. Like the president, why should the presidential candidate of the minority party not be automatically appointed as prime minister by the same authority as the president?
Note too that if the appointment is declined, the president can appoint any elected member of his choice, even apparently from his own party! The cabinet shall be limited to fifteen members, from the parties obtaining the highest and second highest number of votes in proportion to the votes obtained, after consultation with the prime minister. Notwithstanding all the talk of the need for government officials to provide good reasons for their decisions that can be challenged in the courts, and we are aware of what consultations have come to mean in Guyana.
The essence of shared governance is the constitutional distribution of executive authority in a fashion that allows for the independent ethnic protection of its interest and its perception of the national interests. It is upon this that the sharing of national executive authority must be constructed: it is not the mere sharing of ministerial/national positions by majoritarian regimes.
Staying within the narrow operational framework suggested by Ralph, his recommendations appear to have left the national executive authority in Guyana in the same pluralist/majoritarian winner-takes-all political mould that previous constitutional reforms should have changed.
At the very least, Guyana’s constitution should, among other things, be reformed to remove the plurality that automatically gives the presidency to the party that gains the highest vote at national election and introduce super majorities and vetoes at appropriate points. The controversy over what took place at the recent National Toshaos Council suggests that the indigenous people, who are about 11% of the population, are being totally institutionally dominated by the PPP, but are usually left out of shared governance type political equations.
