A Review of David Granger’s The Defence of the New River.

Guyana’s President Irfaan Ali recently paid a three-day visit to the Republic of Suriname to attend the country’s 45^th Independence anniversary celebrations. The Guyana President, appeared relaxed and at ease, comfortable in the company of his colleague Head of State – two newly-minted Presidents developing a close rapport.

The optics were good. They suggested that relations between Guyana and Suriname were all hunky-dory and, as the Guyanese President said during his address to that country’s National Assembly, the future of the two countries’ economies were intertwined.

This was not always the case. Tensions had flared between the two countries in 1967. The source of that tension was an area of Guyana which is claimed by Suriname. Suriname still retains its claim to the area which is by no means small –being the size of the Trinidad and Tobago.

David Granger’s The Defence of the New River examines the successful operation which was launched by Guyana, in August 1969, to defend the New River area from a belligerent attempt by Suriname to establish an airstrip and a military camp at a point called Tigri.

The operation had its genesis in an incident in December 1967 when a detachment of police evicted persons from an area between New River and Oronoque River. The intruders were purportedly undertaking surveying activities in the area on behalf of Suriname. The eviction was done by the police. It inflamed tensions between the two states and led to a bellicose outburst by the then Surinamese President, in his country’s National Assembly.

Less than a year and half later, Suriname began establishing an airstrip and military camp at Tigri. Diplomatic efforts failed to stop the exercise and, as such, the then Prime Minister of Guyana, Forbes Burnham, authorized a lightning operation to repel the illegal activities and the encroachment on Guyanese territory. This operation forms the subject of Granger’s book, The Defence of New River.

The book is divided into 8 sections, each providing an enriching and enlightening account and analysis of a specific aspect of the incident and the controversy it provoked. The sections are as follows:

1. Guyana’s territory: details the legacy of contested boundaries which Guyana inherited at Independence in 1966. Guyana has contested boundaries with two of its three neighbours, Suriname and Venezuela. The section on to describe the size and topography of the contested New River area;
2. Dutch geopolitics: Suriname was still a Dutch colony in 1969. This section examines the historical and economic antecedents to the dispute. It implies that Suriname’s actions may have been influenced by the need to tap additional sources of renewable energy for  power its bauxite operations;
3. Suriname’s politics: adopts a level- of- analysis approach by examining that country’s internal political dynamics. Granger mentions the existence of political tensions among the country’s parties. He does not imply however that Suriname’s actions were intended as a political diversion or as form of political grandstanding.
4. Suriname’s bellicosity: discusses the response of the then President of Suriname to the earlier incident in December 1967 when surveyors were expelled from an area between New River and Oronque River. The Suriname President promised that the personnel would return and if necessary with the help of armed forces.
5. Camp Tigri: scrutinizes the developments which triggered the operation of August 1969. These actions including an attempt to establish a military camp and to construct an area in New River;
6. Guyana’s Defence is an attempt by the author to establish that the operation was only launched after the failure to find a diplomatic solution;
7. The assault on Tigri recounts the details of the actual operation and Guyana’s assertion of sovereignty over the area.
8. Diplomacy and defence relates the efforts which were made, particularly by then Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago, Eric Williams, to reduce tensions and foster peace between the two states.

As a result of Eric Williams’s mediation, both sides issued a Joint Declaration committing to the de-militarization of the area. Ganger suggests that the Joint Declaration was non-binding. Declarations, however, are expressions of intention and will and may be considered as binding under international law.

Guyana has not honored its commitment to the de-militarization of the New River. The Guyana Defence Force still maintains a military watch-post in the New River area, more that 20 years after the Tigri operation.

Granger provides no evidence that Suriname is in similar breach. But he says that there is no evidence that Suriname ratified the Declaration or withdrew its forces.

Both Guyana and Suriname have enjoyed good relations since the signing of the Declaration. But differences over New River and over marine boundaries have led to incidents, including protests over Suriname’s display of maps incorporating the New River area and by the expulsion of an oil exploration vessel. These incidents triggered a flurry of diplomatic activities to reduce tensions and promote peace.

The still unsettled dispute over New River has not hindered the development of relations between the two states. David Granger himself as President had visited Suriname and met with that country’s then President, on more than one occasion.

However, the cycle of tension-provoking incidents, followed by diplomatic blandishments are not healthy for the long-term security of both states, especially now, given the public pronouncements that the economies of the two states will be intertwined.

Good neighborly relations often belie the tensions simmering beneath the surface. These tensions can explode especially when valuable resources are involved. The New River area is a resource-rich area and, therefore, remains a potential flashpoint of conflict.

Diplomacy has been Guyana’s main weapon in overcoming its inherited legacy of contested borders. But diplomacy has its limitations. Guyana’s experience with Suriname establishes that a country must always be ready to defend its territory and assert its sovereignty.

Kofi Anan, the former United Nations Secretary General, once said, “You can do a lot with diplomacy, but with diplomacy backed up by force you can get a lot more done.”  David Granger has never suggested that Guyana should back its diplomacy by the use of force. He has always rejected the use of threat of force to settle disputes. But this book is reminder that while diplomacy is a means of deterrence, it is not the only means available.