The Government’s proposal to establish a Guyana Development Bank is, at its core, a good idea. Guyana needs more entrepreneurs, more local ownership, more manufacturing, more value-added production, and more opportunities for ordinary citizens to participate in the country’s economic growth. Commercial banks often struggle to serve first-time entrepreneurs, small businesses, farmers, innovators, and citizens who lack substantial collateral. A properly designed development bank can help close that gap.
The problem is not the idea. The problem is the structure.
In its current form, the proposed Guyana Development Bank appears less like an independent development institution and more like an open invitation to abuse, discrimination, patronage, and political influence. In a country already burdened by accusations of favoritism, unequal treatment, and the concentration of opportunity among the well-connected, Parliament should be building safeguards into this institution, not removing them.
The proposed bank will reportedly begin with approximately $40 billion in public funds. That is not a small grant programme or pilot initiative. It is one of the largest pools of public money ever assembled for economic development in Guyana. Yet the legislation gives enormous authority to political appointees while providing remarkably little independent oversight.
Chartered Accountant and Attorney Christopher Ram has identified what may be the most troubling aspect of the legislation. According to Ram, the Guyana Development Bank will be exempt from the Financial Institutions Act and therefore outside the supervisory authority of the Bank of Guyana.
As Ram noted, “The most troubling feature is that the Bank is exempt from the Financial Institutions Act and therefore from oversight by the Bank of Guyana. Unlike every other financial institution, it will not be subject to independent prudential supervision, inspections or regulatory intervention.”
That observation alone should trigger serious concern.
If the institution is a bank, why should it not be subject to banking supervision? Why should an institution managing $40 billion of taxpayers’ money operate under fewer safeguards than institutions managing private capital? Public money deserves more scrutiny, not less.
Equally concerning is the governance structure. The proposed legislation allows the Minister of Finance to appoint the Chairperson, Deputy Chairperson, and Directors. There is no meaningful role for the Opposition, civil society, the private sector, professional associations, transparency bodies, or other independent stakeholders.
Supporters of the legislation may argue that the current administration can be trusted to act fairly. That misses the point entirely. Good governance is not built on trust. It is built on accountability. Laws should be designed to restrain power, not accommodate it. Every government eventually becomes an opposition. The true test of legislation is whether we would be comfortable granting the same powers to our political opponents.
In Guyana, where public confidence in institutions is often fragile, concentrating control over $40 billion in the hands of government appointees is a recipe for suspicion. Even if every decision is made honestly, many citizens will question whether loans are being distributed fairly. If even a handful of questionable loans emerge, confidence in the institution could collapse entirely.
The danger is not simply corruption. The more likely danger is selective opportunity.
A politically connected applicant receives flexibility. A friend of the system gets a second chance. A favored business owner receives assistance navigating the process. Meanwhile, an equally deserving entrepreneur without the right connections is quietly rejected.
No laws need be broken for this to happen. No envelopes need change hands. Opportunity simply becomes concentrated among those already closest to power.
The legislation raises another important concern. It allows loans to be granted with or without collateral and with or without interest. As Professor C. Kenrick Hunte recently noted, some combinations begin to resemble welfare transfers rather than sustainable development financing. If loans are issued without interest and without collateral, taxpayers deserve to know how the institution will sustain itself and how public funds will be protected from excessive losses.
Yet perhaps the greatest omission in the legislation is the absence of clear development priorities.
Christopher Ram correctly observed that the Bill establishes a $40 billion development bank without identifying lending priorities or target sectors. That omission is extraordinary. A genuine development bank should have measurable objectives. Parliament and the public should know exactly who the institution is intended to serve.
How many loans will go to women-owned businesses?
How many will support Indigenous entrepreneurs?
How many will assist Afro-Guyanese business owners?
How many will reach Regions One, Seven, Eight, and Nine?
How many will support young entrepreneurs, technology ventures, agriculture, manufacturing, and value-added industries?
If the purpose of the bank is development, then development should be measurable.
The solution is not complicated. The bank should operate under independent Bank of Guyana supervision. Its board should be independent and broadly representative of Guyanese society. Senior executives should be selected through a transparent professional process rather than political appointment. Detailed annual reports should disclose lending by region, gender, sector, and other relevant categories. Strong whistleblower protections, conflict-of-interest rules, and penalties for misconduct should be built directly into the legislation.
There is a good idea at the heart of this proposal. On that point, supporters and critics largely agree. But good ideas alone do not build strong institutions. Governance does.
The question before Parliament is not whether Guyana should have a Development Bank. It should.
The question is whether Guyana is building an independent development institution designed to expand opportunity for all citizens, or whether it is creating a $40 billion patronage machine that future generations will view as another missed opportunity.
The answer will not be determined by the speeches made when the bank opens. It will be determined by the safeguards Parliament chooses to include before the first dollar is ever lent.
