Dear Editor
The recent statement attributed to the Minister of Public Service recommending an expanded dependence on eGovernment systems to manage critical public services without first proving the security, capacity, and integrity of these platforms is both reckless and irresponsible. No responsible government adopts technological reforms of this scale on political slogans. Such a transition requires demonstrable evidence that the State possesses the technical competence, cybersecurity infrastructure, legislative foundation, and management protocols necessary to safeguard citizens’ information and guarantee reliable services. Until these fundamentals are met, the Guyanese people are being placed at unnecessary and avoidable risk.
THE PPP’S RECORD: A PHILOSOPHY OF NEGLECT
For all their rhetoric about “digital transformation,” the People’s Progressive Party has never demonstrated a philosophy rooted in respect for data, system security, or competent technological oversight. Their history suggests the opposite, an approach marked by mismanagement, weak accountability, and institutional decay.
BEFORE 2015, UNDER THE PPP:
The National Data Management Authority (NDMA) was dysfunctional.
The national eGovernment Project drifted without clear objectives, measurable outcomes, or technical leadership.
The fibre optic cable project once marketed as a landmark ICT breakthrough collapsed under mismanagement.
The One Laptop programme became a symbol of waste, poor design, and political optics.
The National Data Management Authority was underutilised, poorly secured, and left structurally vulnerable.
Even the Huawei supported initiatives were scarred by weak governance, inadequate transparency, and limited institutional capacity.
This was not a momentary lapse, it was the philosophy of the PPP’s governance.
POST-2015: REBUILDING A FOUNDATION
When the Coalition Government assumed office, the ICT and eGovernance landscape required reconstruction from the ground up. The Coalition aligned the functions of the NDMA to its constitutional mandate, clarified operational workflows, and began laying the legislative and infrastructural foundations needed for a credible digital ecosystem. Work was done to secure the data centre, restore core networks, and modernise ICT protocols, steps necessary to align the programme with recognised international models of governance.
WHERE THE PROGRAMME IS NOW
Today, however, the eGovernment programme, especially the rollout of the National eID system has again fallen into a space of opacity and political control. Government has produced no clear vision outlining how the digital transformation will work, who its institutional actors are, or what protections exist for citizens and their data.
There is no clearly defined role for:
The NDMA
Civil Society
Independent Oversight Bodies
Government Ministries
Citizens
Financial Institutions
Data Protection Authorities
This absence of structure exposes the entire digital architecture to political manipulation.
THE LEGISLATIVE VACUUM
The Prime Minister himself has admitted that current legislation is insufficient, yet the Government has taken no urgent steps to enact comprehensive laws to support a digital ID system and eGovernment regime. The eID initiative requires its own dedicated legislation, covering:
Protocols for access to personal data
Restrictions on political interference
Institutional accountability
Independent oversight
Data retention rules
Audit trails
Secured authentication
Penalties for breaches
Without such legislation, citizens have no guarantees that their data will not be abused, exactly what unfolded during the 2025 elections, where citizens’ information was misused for political gain.
PUBLIC SAFETY AND NATIONAL SECURITY
When the recent bombing occurred, the Minister of Home Affairs stated that the eID system would help the Government track migrants. This raises serious national security questions:
If the Government itself does not have a secure, tested, and audited system, how can an unprepared eID platform protect anyone?
What infrastructure exists to secure our lives once all citizens are placed onto a centralised digital identity platform?
None has been demonstrated.
None has been independently verified.
None has been publicly accounted for.
THE RISK OF TOTAL SURVEILLANCE
With the eID system as currently designed, the Government will gain one-stop access to the private lives of every citizen. Without trust, without transparency, and without oversight, Guyanese citizens risk losing control of their most sensitive data.
OUTSOURCING CITIZENS DATA
It has been brought to our attention that with NDMA’s limited capacity, the Government has already farmed out citizens’ data to external actors/agencies. Can citizens be informed if this is so and who they are? The Government proudly references Estonia’s model and the Huawei partnership. But the real questions remain unanswered:
Does Guyana have the capacity to facilitate the implementation of the eID programme?
Why is the NDMA, the statutory body legally responsible for data processing and management being starved of resources while foreigners and contractors handle citizens’ personal data?
Is NDMA carrying out its constitutional mandate and do they have the capacity to handle the Government’s eID programme?
Why is the Government farming out national data instead of building local capacity and strengthening national institutions?
A modern eGovernment system must be built on a secure national foundation, not outsourced in pieces to external contractors with no parliamentary scrutiny.
THE CORE ISSUE: TRUST
We cannot trust a government that:
Failed to maintain the very infrastructure responsible for protecting citizens’ data
Politicised every major ICT programme
Demonstrated no respect for transparency
Continues to operate the current digital agenda without oversight
The PPP speaks loudly about digital progress, but their own history reveals a pattern of digital decay.
THE WAY FORWARD
If this Government wants credibility on eGovernment and digital ID, they must first:
1. Show the national philosophy guiding this transformation
2. Strengthen the NDMA and empower it with resources to properly carryout its constitutional mandate.
3. Enact comprehensive, modern eGovernance and data protection legislation
4. Define clear institutional roles for all stakeholders
5. Establish public guarantees against misuse of citizens’ data
6. Produce independently verified security audits
7. Rebuild public confidence through transparency
Until then, these proposals must be rigorously challenged, not because we oppose technological progress, but because the safety, privacy, and rights of the Guyanese people demand nothing less.
Yours truly,
K. Sharma Solomon
Member of Parliament APNU Representative
Ministry of Public Service, Government Efficiency & Implementation
