President Irfaan Ali’s recent warning that “we are going to come after you hard and strong” may sound like a decisive crackdown on wrongdoing in the gold-mining sector — but analysts and observers say the timing raises more questions than confidence.
In fact, as commentator GHK Lall argues, the tough talk feels less like long-awaited accountability and more like a late performance under international pressure. “We are going to come after you hard and strong.” Lall responds: “Only now, Excellency?”
For years, he writes, successive PPP administrations embraced the same gold-mining interests they now threaten. “Whether PPP or PNC… voters can always count on Pres. Ali to say the right thing,” Lall notes, but the actions rarely aligned. He points to the infamous moment when Ali rode in a “bulletproof vehicle” belonging to one of those well-connected mining magnates during the 2020 inauguration — a symbol of the closeness between the political elite and the mining class. “That was then, this is now,” he writes, questioning why warnings from U.S. law enforcement “long ago” were mocked, sidestepped, or ignored.
Those warnings have only grown louder.
In 2024 Guyana’s Financial Intelligence Unit reported a G$2 billion dirty-money trail, built from Suspicious Transaction Reports (STRs). FIU director Matthew Langevine could not release names, but, as Lall sharply noted, “A dirty money trail means that there are dirty people behind that kind of money… Let Guyanese have some names, Mr. Matthew Langevine.” The problem, he wrote, is that “the people above him… political people, law enforcement people… all know the names.
He argued that many of the same individuals behind suspicious transactions are “their donors, even their friends,” a criticism that goes beyond the FIU and cuts directly into the credibility of the government now promising to clean up the very system that allowed such transactions to flourish.
The pressure intensified with the release of a confidential United States (U.S.) investigative report — Operation Gold Digger — exposing a transnational gold-smuggling and money-laundering scheme involving Guyanese suppliers, U.S. customs brokers, and intermediaries across at least five countries.
U.S investigators discovered gold shipped from Guyana as “scrap and waste gold” to avoid the 5.5% duty applicable to semi-worked gold and jewelry. “Several JFK exams… revealed the gold to be either semi-worked gold or jewelry,” the report stated, highlighting systematic misclassification and a laundering cycle supported by FinCEN 105 declarations.
The U.S. analysis traced the network to businesses operating under fictitious names on the West Coast Demerara and in Berbice, and connected several entities to suspicious financial activity, smuggling networks, and offshore accounts.
While the report does not accuse the People’s Progressive Party (PPP) Government of direct involvement, it acknowledges that some persons of interest have political and commercial influence inside Guyana — a reality U.S. agency have monitored “for more than a decade.”
This backdrop of gold-related criminal activity amplifies Lall’s broader accusation that Guyana’s political establishment only acts when “the white people watching,” arguing that accountability is often performative. He suggests the sudden government urgency mirrors a “housecleaning” response to mounting foreign scrutiny rather than a principled campaign. “When the heat is on from the foreigners,” he writes, “the word is cooldown… because we are going to have to do something to prove sincerity.”
The contradictions are evident. Even as the government threatens illegal actors in the gold sector, the public has learned that private insurance companies refused to insure vehicles belonging to high-profile businessmen only after U.S. sanctions — and reportedly under quiet guidance from state authorities.
Meanwhile, U.S. investigators tighten their focus. Operation Gold Digger and the FIU’s $2 billion trail reveal an ecosystem of tax evasion, gold smuggling, bulk-cash movement, bribery, and trade-based laundering — all occurring during years when, as Lall puts it, Guyanese were told everything was “progress” while “relationships, friendships, sponsorships” were quietly shaping outcomes.
Against this backdrop, President Ali’s vow to “come after” offenders rings less like a new doctrine of integrity and more like a belated reaction to international alarms. As Lall writes, “When farces were being shared out, Guyana got a tsunami of them.”
The question now is whether this promised crackdown marks a real departure from the past — or merely another moment where, in Lall’s words, “words that are supposed to sound authoritative and impressive have been sabotaged by the negative.”
