Dear Editor,
I make reference to Mr. Azruddin Mohamed’s failed bail application before Magistrate Abigail Gibbs on the 30th of October, 2026, and the subsequent fixed date application for Judicial Review that was dismissed on the 16th of November, 2026.
The appropriate grounds for judicial review are that the Magistrate erred by remanding Mr. Azruddin Mohamed in custody without first considering whether reasonable conditions could prevent the identified risks of (i) further offending and (ii) interference with witness (particularly with SI Narine).
It is an error of law and principle to refuse bail and remand an accused person in custody without undertaking the constitutionally necessary assessment of whether the legitimate objectives of detention (in this case, preventing further offending and interfering with witnesses) can be better achieved through appropriately tailored conditions of bail.
The Magistrate’s duty is to uphold an accused person’s presumption of innocence pursuant to Article 144(2)(a) of the Constitution and their right to personal liberty preserved by Article 139(4).
The latter of which sets out the right of a person detained on suspicion of committing a criminal offence to be released, either unconditionally or upon reasonable conditions.
Ofcourse there are recognised exceptions where there are reasonable grounds for believing that the person will fail to surrender, commit further offences, interfere with witnesses or otherwise obstruct the course of justice.
However, whilst a Magistrate’s power to remand is largely discretionary, Article 139(4) (in setting out a positive right) is a mandatory provision (“shall be released”) creating a necessary two-fold assessment to be exhausted prior to any remand in custody.
Firstly, can the accused be remanded on unconditional bail?
If not, by reason of a recognised ground for refusal, then:
Secondly, can the risks arising from such ground (i.e. the risk of further offending or interfering with witnesses) be addressed by reasonable conditions.
This Constitutional provision is mandatory in nature and it is an error of law for the Magistrate not to consider obvious conditions such as a curfew, house arrest or electric monitoring, all of which will preserve the accused’s right to liberty and dissipate the risk of further offending and interfering with witnesses, thereby striking the right balance between personal liberty and the recognised risks.
The Magistrate’s High Court affidavit itself failed to positively illustrate compliance with the mandatory provision of Article 139(4). Therefore, it ought to be fresh grounds for a renewed application of Judicial Review. Although, counsel’s path to bail appears to be easier on Appeal to the High Court, as suggested in the judgement of Judge Chandra-Hanif.
Judicial Review on the matter is nonetheless of public importance to ensure that the right to liberty in Guyana is actively protected by giving the High Court a second opportunity to affirm that it is mandatory to release an innocent man in one of two ways (conditionally/unconditionally) and in complying with the Constitutional mandate for release, Magistrate’s must actively set out reasons why conditions are insufficient to mitigate any risks posed.
Further, bail conditions rest on an escalating scale of constraint. If reporting to the police station (a condition imposed by the extradition hearings) is insufficient to prevent further offending (as evidenced by the course of conduct of the accused) then a more stringent condition should first be considered BEFORE capriciously jumping to the end of the scale by remanding in custody.
It is noted that the Magistrate “stated” that the Accused’s innocence was explicitly affirmed but it is submitted that the presumption of innocence must be practiced not stated.
Yours Faithfully,
Concerned Citizen





