By Mark DaCosta- The rapid deployment of high-tech policing tools across our nation has collided with a troubling wall of legislative opacity, raising urgent constitutional questions about privacy, civil liberties, and executive overreach.
Following the administration’s recent unveiling of its Smart Patrol initiative — which integrates automated number-plate reading and facial recognition into routine law enforcement — opposition Member of Parliament Sherod Duncan has sounded the alarm over the absence of transparent legal frameworks, data protection protocols, and independent oversight.
While the Ministry of Home Affairs has publicly confirmed that vehicle registration checks draw upon the Safe Road Intelligent System (SRIS), officials have remained conspicuously silent regarding the origin of the biometric databases powering the facial scanning software or the human verification safeguards required before officers detain a citizen.
In a political climate where critics and opposition figures already face aggressive state scrutiny, expanding mass biometric surveillance without enforceable statutory guardrails risks turning modern policing infrastructure into an unchecked instrument of political control.
This confrontation over digital privacy is neither sudden nor isolated; rather, it represents the culmination of a year-long parliamentary campaign by Duncan to compel transparency regarding the state’s growing technological footprint.
As early as November 2025, the opposition legislator formally petitioned the National Assembly for clarity surrounding electronic identification programmes and the deployment of police surveillance drones.
Recognising the potential for algorithmic bias and executive abuse, he followed up in May 2026 by tabling a formal motion advocating for the establishment of an independent Surveillance Commissioner to audit state monitoring activities.
By October 2026, his inquiries had grown increasingly granular, pressing the administration to disclose the specific custodians of the facial repositories being queried, the statutory instruments authorising their use, the empirical error rates of the recognition algorithms, and the exact operational status of the Data Protection Act 2023—legislation passed years earlier whose practical commencement and ministerial enforcement mechanisms remain shrouded in ambiguity.
Rather than yielding ministerial accountability, however, these formal inquiries have run aground on procedural rulings within the legislature. Official correspondence dated 5 November 2026 reveals that the Speaker of the National Assembly struck down Duncan’s critical questions regarding facial-recognition safeguards, invoking Standing Order 20(1)(h) on the grounds of national security.
Consequently, substantive queries addressing who controls citizens’ biometric files, how long those records are retained, and what recourse exists for individuals misidentified by flawed software have been barred from the parliamentary order paper. As Duncan noted in his statement, genuine operational security should never be conflated with a blanket refusal to disclose basic legal authorities and accuracy benchmarks, warning that “disallowing questions does not answer them”.
Compounding this legislative bottleneck is a separate procedural controversy involving the sudden revocation of previously approved parliamentary questions. Duncan has formally contested the November withdrawal of Notice Papers 33–35 and 38–44 under Standing Order 20(1)(k), a rule barring queries reliant upon unverified media reports.
Notably, those very citations had been inserted during earlier revisions requested by the Clerk’s Office, cleared subsequent administrative vetting, and were officially published on 13 January 2026 before being circulated to members on 21 January. Reversing that approval nearly ten months later without explaining why minor phrasing adjustments could not have preserved the core inquiries has deepened opposition concerns that procedural technicalities are being leveraged to shield ministers from scrutiny.
For citizens across our country, the convergence of unverified biometric policing and curtailed parliamentary oversight strikes at the heart of democratic governance. Facial recognition algorithms are notoriously prone to false positives, particularly among non-Caucasian demographics, meaning that reliance on uncalibrated databases without mandatory human corroboration invites wrongful arrests and systemic harassment.
Ultimately, technological modernisation in law enforcement must be anchored in transparent law and public trust; as Duncan aptly cautioned, “technological capability must never become a licence for unchecked state power”.
Until the administration publicly delineates the legal boundaries governing Smart Patrol and parliamentary authorities restore meaningful legislative scrutiny, the biometric data of everyday Guyanese remains vulnerable in an expanding, unregulated digital dragnet.







