MARAD inspector Christopher Bailey told the Presidential Commission of Inquiry on Tuesday that his November 17, 2025 inspection of the MV Barima involved checklist-based checks, equipment testing and the recording of deficiencies.
He reported no visible damage in the areas he examined, but could not confirm whether the deficiencies identified were corrected before the ferry sank on July 18.
The legal framework for the inspection came under scrutiny, with Bailey identifying the Coasting and Passenger Trade Regulations, made under the Shipping Casualties (Investigation and Prevention) Act, as his reference.
He said he understood the State-owned ferry to be exempt from mandatory inspection, but that MARAD nevertheless conducted the exercise as part of its safety responsibilities.
Commissioners questioned which requirements applied to the vessel and how those related to MARAD’s inspection checklist. Bailey explained that the checklist included equipment beyond what he understood the regulations to require.
He also distinguished his job title, Surveyor of Ships, from the work he performed. He said he was not a statutory surveyor and described his examination of the Barima as a visual inspection rather than a detailed structural survey.
“The work I had undertaken at MARAD consisted of inspections rather than surveys,” he said in his statement.
Reappearing before the commission at the Arthur Chung Conference Centre, Bailey said he had been with MARAD for three months when he inspected the ferry. His examination covered the bridge, passenger areas, main deck and engine room.
The inspection recorded 16 deficiencies. Bailey said the ferry was docked and not operating when he conducted the inspection. He submitted his report to MARAD’s Director of Safety, and it was marked as seen on November 19.
Among his findings were life rafts several years overdue for servicing and an Emergency Position-Indicating Radio Beacon with an expired battery. He explained that the rafts could not be opened during his inspection because their examination and servicing required a specialised facility.
Approximately 200 to 250 life jackets were observed in the passenger area. Bailey testified that he took them all down and inspected them. He described the jackets as orange, with reflective material and whistles, but without lights. He said they would have been accessible to passengers at the time of his visit.
Bailey reported that the radar, Global Positioning System and Very High Frequency radio were operational. Paper charts were present, although no Automatic Identification System equipment was fitted.
The crane functioned, but its remote control did not, and crane documentation was not available. Fire and smoke detectors were tested and found satisfactory, while servicing stickers on fire extinguishers were also examined.
Several vessel certificates were recorded as “not seen”. Bailey clarified that this meant they were not found on board during the inspection, not necessarily that they did not exist.
On the vessel’s physical condition, he said he saw no visible leaks, abrasions or damage in the areas examined and assessed its condition as fair. That assessment, he explained, rested on visual observations rather than a detailed structural survey.
“The inspection is very, very important to make sure that the ship is running in order,” Bailey said, explaining that an outside examination could identify matters overlooked by crew members working aboard daily.
Commissioners also questioned his decision not to review the previous inspection report, either before or after his visit. Bailey said he relied on MARAD’s checklist and his own observations.
On follow-up procedures, he explained that operators would notify MARAD after correcting deficiencies, allowing inspectors to return and verify the work.
In the Barima’s case, however, Bailey said he received no instruction to undertake a further inspection following his November report. His evidence did not establish whether the deficiencies he recorded had been corrected before the sinking.
DPI
