Dear Editor,
I apologise for the length of this letter. Its subject, the CH&PA, deals with billions of dollars, vast areas of State land and projects of major political and financial significance. No one even tries to defend its record against evidence of unlawful reporting failures, deficient accounting and conflict-of-interest concerns surrounding its audit by the Audit Office. Silica City – the brainchild of President Ali – is not merely another housing scheme. It is the creation of a new city involving substantial public expenditure, State land and long-term commitments. I have called it “Pradoville 3 in the Making” because that combination of political power, public assets and inadequate transparency demands close scrutiny.
CH&PA now says approximately G$9.1 billion is being invested in Region Three to develop more than 3,800 serviced residential lots. That is about G$2.4 million per lot.
But compare that with the original Saudi announcement. In June 2023, the Government announced a US$100 million Saudi Fund loan for housing infrastructure intended to provide about 2,500 housing units across three regions, including roads, water, sewerage, electricity, wells and social facilities. US$100 million is approximately G$21 billion. Yet CH&PA now says G$9.1 billion – less than half that amount – will produce more than 3,800 lots in Region Three alone.
That is too major an issue to go unnoticed. One region will apparently produce over 50% more lots for G$9.1 billion than the 2,500 units originally associated with a G$21 billion programme across three regions. The press should have asked: Has the project changed? Were “housing units” and “serviced lots” being used differently? What happened to the original scope? How much of the Saudi loan has been drawn down and spent? What are Regions Four and Six receiving?
Instead, we had diversions from the CH&PA actors. CEO Martin Pertab said the contracts provide for completion within ten months, but CH&PA wants the works finished in six or seven. Director of Projects Omar Narine warned that performance would be considered when future contracts are awarded.
If ten months is the contractual period, why is six or seven now being demanded? If accelerated completion was essential, why was it not written into the contracts? More importantly, what do the contracts say about performance bonds, liquidated damages, retention, default and termination? Billion-dollar contracts should be enforced through their terms, not exhortations or vague warnings about future work.
Narine’s comment raises another issue. Contractor performance can properly matter in future procurement, but only through transparent, objective and consistently applied criteria. Public contracts should not depend on informal displeasure or favour.
The wider issue is CH&PA itself. It controls enormous quantities of State land and billions of public dollars while meaningful public reporting has diminished. Opacity creates the conditions in which waste, favouritism, misuse of public funds and corruption can go undetected.
Silica City sharpens that concern. It is closely associated with President Ali and involves valuable State land, major public expenditure and long-term commitments, yet the public still lacks a clear project-level account of its total cost, contracts, expenditure and parliamentary authority.
The questions were obvious: Why do the Saudi numbers no longer appear to match? Where are the contracts? Where are the penalties? How much has actually been spent? What is the full cost of Silica City? Under what parliamentary authority is it proceeding? And where are CH&PA’s comprehensive annual reports?
When a public institution – with major issues of corruption and lack of accountability on its CV – operates behind such a wall of opacity, the value of the press lies not merely in reporting what it is told, but in interrogation and investigation. My respectful view is that it is not too late.
Yours truly
Christopher Ram
