Mohamed Extradition: Is Washington Now Playing Both Sides?

Dear Editor,

I have written previous letters on the Mohameds/US/PPP controversy regarding the US request for the extradition of Azruddin and his father, Nazar Mohamed, to the USA to face an 11-count indictment related to gold trading and financial crimes. Now that Azruddin Mohamed is the leader of the opposition and his WIN party is the major opposition party in parliament, there is no denying that his extradition has become a political matter for Guyana and the US governments.

In my previous assessment of this matter, I contend, and continue to do so, that the Mohameds/PPP conflict is a consequence of US foreign policy and its desire to reconfigure the political architecture in Guyana going forward in the context of oil and the inevitable rise of younger-generation politicians. Now that the Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ) has ruled against the Mohameds and the extradition case is back in the local courts, it is necessary to revisit this matter with an objective political lens.

The faith of the Mohameds from the start rested in the hands of the Americans, and that will determine whether they would be extradited. If they are, their chances in the US court will largely depend on what importance the US administration is putting on a conviction. The last utterances of the US Ambassador on the matter a few months ago left the country with the impression that the US views the charges against the Mohameds as serious and have spent US taxpayers’ dollars on the matter.

While the Ambassador’s statements at the time reflected the Trump administration’s position, one is not sure if there has been a rethinking in Washington on this issue. I have taken the position that Mohamed’s meeting with the Americans before he decided to enter the 2025 elections was the green light for him to do so. I had contended that the Americans were faced with a dilemma as they attempted to reconfigure Guyana’s political reality.  Mohamed became a useful tool after they failed to get Indian defectors from the PPP to do what the African defectors did to the APNU and, by extension, the African community.

The goal of the Americans was the rise of a third force led by younger generation politicians and a hung parliament after the elections, furthering the US/ Western push to reconfigure the politics in the country. My take is that the US wanted to deny both the APNU and the PPPC from controlling both the presidency and the parliament.  From an American point of view, Azruddin was allowed to enter the election as a last-ditch attempt by the US to pull away Indian votes from the PPP to achieve its plan to reconfigure Guyana politics.

If my analysis is correct, objectively Mohamed and WIN were extensions of US policy in Guyana. As things stand, Mohamed has kept his side of the bargain by entering into the elections. The question is whether the US is satisfied and will keep its end of the agreement now that Mohamed has emerged as a beneficiary of his election sojourn and has failed to attract Indian votes away from the PPP, causing the US “Grand” plan to fall on its face. The much-desired hung parliament did not materialise.  Instead, the result was an entrenched PPPC with three additional seats, serious damage to the APNU, and a divided and weakened opposition, with Mohamed emerging as opposition leader. These were among the unintended consequences of the US policy.

They succeeded in breaking the back of the APNU and, by extension, seriously weakening the political position of the African community, while strengthening the PPPC and, by extension, the political position of the Indian community. The rise of Mohamed as opposition leader objectively adds another dimension to the already significant concentration of economic and political power within the Indian community. I don’t think this was the intended goal of US policy. Nevertheless, both the United States and those African collaborators bear a moral and political responsibility to confront and help correct this dangerous racial and political imbalance in the country.

The above view in no way premised on the idea that the Trump administration wanted to remove the PPP from office but instead wanted to weaken the PPPC. A hung parliament would mean that the US and its Western allies would have more control of both the old and new forces in the parliament and, in that environment, tighten their control over the politics in the country – in the context that none of those forces are anti-US or possess any ideological threat to US interests.

While the Americans were satisfied and supportive of the PPPC in government, I judge that they would have preferred to be dealing with a weakened PPPC, which would allow it to exert more leverage going forward. It should be obvious to both PPPC and WIN that now that the US is in control of Venezuelan oil, Guyana’s importance in the US plans in that country has ceased to be important.  The logic that caused the US to oust the Granger ( APNU+AFC) administration is no longer an important issue for the Americans.

They solved their problem without the use of Guyanese territory. In relation to Guyana, the US has all the cards in its hands. This must be troubling to both the PPPC and WIN leadership. In their quiet moments, they must be asking whether the Americans are playing both parties. The PPPC in government is in a stronger position in this equation relative to WIN as the major opposition. There is talk in political circles that the US has decided to allow the fate of Mohamed to be resolved at the domestic level, and the bargaining between the Mohameds and the PPPC has begun in earnest. This is a plausible proposition.

From a geopolitical and regional perspective, the way that the Mohameds’ extradition matter unfolds has potentially significant implications. The US Ambassador’s statements expressing the seriousness with which the US administration views the matter, combined with the Mohameds apparent defiance, have placed the US in a difficult position.

Having expended considerable political and diplomatic capital, Washington risks appearing powerless if the matter ends without a meaningful resolution.  Such an outcome would also set an uncomfortable precedent for US hegemony and credibility in the region. Having engaged the issue so forcefully and publicly, The US can’t easily walk away from the present engagement empty-handed.

I will conclude by saying that going forward there is likely to be a deal on the matter between the three parties (the Mohameds, the US and the PPPC) with each saving some face. If this happens, the obvious question is whether the Mohameds and the PPPC can be reconciled and what will be the future of WIN.  Can the PPPC and WIN coexist?

Yours truly,
Tacuma Ogunseye