Support Village Voice News With a Donation of Your Choice.
Contrary to the Final Report of the European Union Elections Follow-up Mission on Guyana (1st June 2023), the Constitution of Guyana does not contain ‘shared-governance notions’, as usually applied to sharply ethnically polarized societies. The 2000 constitutional reforms merely expanded the committee system of participation, etc., but left them in the usual Westminster type, majoritarian, winner-takes-all, construct that is inappropriate for ethnically divided societies such as Guyana.
It is undemocratic for an ethnic government, with an extremely marginal majority, to have the capacity to end the much-valued separation of powers, i.e., have de facto control of the executive and legislature and tremendous resultant influence over the judiciary. Add to this Guyana’s historic level of ethnic struggle and elections manipulation, and herein lies the problem that shared governance mechanisms are intended to make democratically workable.
The European Union report on the controversial 2020 national and regional elections made 26 reform recommendations, 8 of which were considered priorities, and advised that all of them be considered and implemented by way of a consensual process. The 2023 Final Report noted that there has been ‘no change in the case of 19 of the recommendations. Two recommendations have been implemented in full, while there is partial implementation of one recommendation. Action or activity is ongoing, but implementation has not yet been confirmed, in respect of three recommendations. It is still too early in the electoral cycle to determine the implementation status of one recommendation.’
Of some importance, the 2020 report recognised that ‘The preparation of the list of electors for the 2020 elections proved particularly litigious and complex’ and that both the list and the continuous registration process are very defective. It recommended that Guyana ‘Undertake a thorough update of the decade-old register well ahead of the next election cycle, based on inclusive consultations and political consensus. At the same time ensure greater effectiveness of the ‘continuous’ registration system by improving access – both in terms of geographical spread of registration offices and duration of the registration periods.’
Although the Caricom recount group to the 2020 elections apparently claimed that it did not receive the report containing the numerous discrepancies that resulted from the recount process that it admitted was intended to be more of an audit than a recount, it suggested that: ‘As a minimum condition of electoral reforms, the Team recommend the urgent need for the total re-registration of all voters in Guyana.’
Despite all the difficulties that have surrounded the electoral list, fictitious voting, etc., although the opposition supports these recommendations, the winner-takes-all system is such that the PPP ignored the recommendations and proceeded to unilaterally make changes to the electoral process that have taken aback even the authors of the 2023 report and is likely to make the situation worse.
It substituted only the requirement of a ‘registered address’ in place of ‘residence’ to register to vote. The 2023 report exclaimed that this ‘cannot be characterized as a measure of reform. …[I]t is highly unusual, globally, to accord voting rights within the country to the diaspora. Some countries facilitate out-of-country voting (as Guyana had done in the past and subsequently terminated) enabling the diaspora to vote abroad, but there is no international standard which mandates this. Voters are more usually required to reside and be domiciled in the place where they are registered to vote. This change in the law, adopted in response to a court decision, is extremely controversial, and not perceived to be politically neutral!’
The 2023 report rightly recognized that ‘the political context for electoral reform is one of ‘sharp polarisation’ between the government and the opposition and that it has proven almost impossible for any consensus to be reached on issues of electoral reform, or, more broadly, on any governance issues since the elections in 2020. … The shared governance notions present in the Constitution are unfortunately not being implemented and the legislative role of the National Assembly is limited.’
‘Sharp polarisations’ that exist in homogeneous societies are qualitatively different from the ‘sharp ethnic polarizations’ to be found in countries such as Guyana where two large ethnic groups and their parties’ control over 80% of the voting population and have been in unceasing conflict for more than half a century. These situations usually require forms of executive power-sharing if they are to be democratically manageable.
With about two years left before national and regional elections in 2025, the 2023 report suggested that since many recommendations could be implemented through administrative and procedural rather than legislative change, ‘[t]his period offers enough time to address some of the recurring problems of the electoral process in Guyana!’ The following recommendations have had the highest potential to enhance the quality of electoral processes, and these areas should be therefore prioritised when deciding on any potential future electoral technical assistance: (1) prohibition of the use of state resources for political campaigning (recommendation 11), (2) development of effective legislation to regulate political finance (recommendation 12), (3) transformation of state-owned media into a genuine public service broadcaster (recommendation 13), and (4) establishment of a comprehensive election dispute resolution system (recommendation 23).
In a democratic country, a ruling party, much less one of questionable validity like the PPP, cannot unilaterally legitimately change the electoral rules intended to bring and keep governments in office. But this is precisely what the PPP has been doing, and one must hope that the 2023 report intends and that the party understands that its use of ‘non-parliamentary administrative and procedural means to fulfill the recommendations’ should come only after full consultations and consensus.
But have we not just agreed that finding consensus is all but impossible in this ethnically polarized society? Since the nature of governance cannot be left to the will of individual governments, power-sharing, or the kind of ethnic autocracy the PPP has been perpetuating are the alternatives. From the former standpoint, properly designed, only in the worst-case scenario, when fundamental interests are at stake, is ‘law-making’ gridlock possible and this is far preferable than the present widespread alienation and dictatorship.