Should Guyana’s proposed Development Bank be governed solely by technical experts appointed by the government, or should its oversight structure reflect the country’s political and social diversity?
That question is at the centre of a growing debate over the proposed Guyana Development Bank Bill, with Vigilant Political Action Committee (VPAC) Leader Dorwain Bess and financial analyst Joel Bhagwandin offering contrasting views on how one of the country’s most significant future financial institutions should be governed.
While Bhagwandin argues there is no need for opposition, civil society or private sector representatives on the bank’s Board of Directors, Bess contends that excluding those voices risks creating an institution that lacks broad public confidence in a country where political support remains deeply divided.
The disagreement extends beyond board appointments. It raises a broader question about whether institutions entrusted with billions of dollars in public resources should prioritise technical efficiency alone or incorporate safeguards that promote inclusion, shared ownership and public trust.
In a social media statement, Bess said VPAC supports the creation of a development bank but believes the governance framework requires significant changes.
“VPAC continues to carefully review the proposed Guyana Development Bank Bill and, while we fully support the establishment of a development bank, we are concerned by the governance structure proposed under the legislation.”
According to Bess, the bill concentrates excessive authority in the hands of the responsible minister.
“As presently drafted, the Bill appears to centralise significant authority in the hands of the responsible Minister. The Minister is empowered to appoint the Chairperson, Deputy Chairperson and all other members of the Board of Directors, determine their remuneration and benefits, and exercise considerable influence over key aspects of the bank’s operations.”
He warned that such powers could undermine confidence in the institution’s independence.
“This concentration of authority we believe raises legitimate concerns regarding the bank’s institutional independence, accountability and susceptibility to political influence.
“The fact that board members are eligible for reappointment and that their remuneration is determined by the same office responsible for their appointment can also create perceptions of dependency and undermine public confidence in the institution’s impartiality.”
Bess also expressed concern that the legislation contains no requirement for representation from the parliamentary opposition, civil society, professional organizations, trade unions, the private sector or independent financial institutions.
“Equally troubling is the apparent absence of any statutory requirement for representation from the parliamentary opposition, civil society, professional associations, the private sector, trade unions or independent financial and technical institutions.
“The proposed governance framework provides little by way of checks and balances and offers limited avenues for independent oversight over what will ultimately be an institution entrusted with billions of dollars in public resources.”
VPAC is advocating a governance model that includes opposition participation, independent experts and stakeholder representation, alongside transparent appointment and removal procedures.
Bhagwandin, however, has rejected those proposals, arguing that the Development Bank should not be viewed through a political lens.
“The Guyana Development Bank is not conceived as a political institution; it is a financial institution with a development mandate. That distinction is fundamental,” he wrote.
He maintained that board members should be selected for their professional expertise rather than their organisational or political affiliations.
“It is therefore entirely appropriate that its Board of Directors comprise professionals drawn from banking, finance, economics, law, agriculture, technology and other relevant disciplines necessary to guide a modern development finance institution.”
Bhagwandin further argued that reserving board positions for opposition parties or civil society groups could introduce unnecessary political considerations into the institution’s operations.
“Experience across other institutions has shown that such arrangements can introduce unnecessary disruption and politicisation, with adverse consequences for institutional credibility and effectiveness,” he said.
He also rejected suggestions that the bank would operate without oversight, noting that annual reports and audited financial statements would be subject to parliamentary review and public scrutiny.
The differing perspectives reflect a wider debate about governance in Guyana. Unlike countries where a single political force enjoys overwhelming dominance, Guyana remains a plural society in which electoral support is often divided across political, ethnic and geographic lines.
Supporters of broader representation argue that institutions handling substantial public resources require more than legal accountability mechanisms. They contend that legitimacy is strengthened when diverse political and social interests have a meaningful stake in governance structures.
This is the central distinction between the two positions. Bhagwandin emphasises professional management insulated from political interference—a concept difficult to reconcile with Guyana’s political reality, where loyalty is often rewarded and institutional independence remains a persistent challenge.
Bess, while not disputing the importance of technical expertise, argues that expertise alone may not be sufficient to inspire confidence in a society where trust in public institutions is often influenced by perceptions of inclusion and fairness.
For Bess, the issue is not whether the Development Bank should become political, but whether an institution financed with public resources should be viewed as belonging to all Guyanese rather than to the administration of the day.
“A Development Bank has the potential to become one of the country’s most transformative institutions but its long-term success will depend on its governance architecture,” he said.
“VPAC therefore calls upon the Government and Members of Parliament to carefully reconsider the governance provisions of the Bill and introduce amendments that make the Development Bank a truly national institution devoid of concentrated ministerial control.”
Parliament is expected to examine the proposed legislation in the coming weeks. However, the debate has already expanded beyond the creation of a development bank itself to broader questions about how Guyana structures institutions that manage national wealth and public resources.
While Bhagwandin maintains that professional expertise and existing accountability mechanisms provide sufficient safeguards, Bess argues that in a politically diverse society, legitimacy, inclusiveness and shared oversight are equally important.
The ultimate success of the Development Bank, Bess suggests, may depend not only on the quality of its investments, but also on whether Guyanese across the political spectrum regard it as an institution that serves the nation rather than the government of the day
