Dear Editor,
A Demerara Waves Online article of Monday, 23 February 2026 “Two air traffic controllers suspended for violation of air safety bubble between int’l flights over Guyana,” caused me to ponder certain possibilities unrelated to that near-mishap.
Mr Deodat Indar, the minister with responsibility for aviation is reported to have said that the GCAA and the government had been “getting a lot of kudos” for aviation management in Guyana and so he was wary about the impact of publicising this month’s occurrence. I wondered what else the goodly minister and by extension our government, would have been wary about publicising for fear of incurring a negative view of its aviation management.
I decided to scratch an itch that I could no longer ignore with respect to that December 6, 2023, Guyana Defence Force helicopter disaster which claimed the lives of five military personnel. By now we all might know of the fateful events that have been in the public domain for the past twenty-seven months. We are no where nearer to knowing what caused that catastrophe.
Ian G. Hall in a Guyana Graphic post of October 24, 2024, provides extensive insight into the improbability of the reported destruction of the Multi-Purpose Flight Recorder (MPFR He also shared the specifications of that doomed helicopter, which I will not regurgitate those aspects of his excellent presentation. This when taken with the minister ‘s stance on this matter, leaves plenty of room for doubt and unhelpful speculation.
The aircraft was registered as C-GZIV by Bell Helicopter Canada/Textron and received its initial airworthiness certificate as N-533BB on December 17, 2014, in the US. It remained in the possession and/or use of the manufacturer during the period 2014–2017. Notably, great pains are taken to point out that the aircraft described as new, was later acquired at a cost of approximately $414.2 million and commissioned for the GDF in March 2021, with registration 8R-AYA, an event that took place well after 2018.
Thus, we are told that between its manufacture in 2014 and the end of 2017, the aircraft was primarily under the ownership of Bell Helicopter Canada/Textron while located at Bell Textron in Fort Worth, Texas. Question: when exactly was the helicopter purchased and where was the aircraft located and what was its status during the intervening three plus years?
A simple online search revealed that public records show that the Bell 412 EPI) aircraft with serial number 37002, registered as N533BB) was used for demonstration purposes, including being displayed at the Alliance Fort Worth Airshow on October 15, 2016. Between 2015-2017, the helicopter was used as a demonstrator for the Bell 412EPI variant, showcasing its upgraded capabilities, which include the Bell BasiX-Pro flight deck, PT6T-9 engines, and improved performance features.
The Bell 412EPI (specifically demonstrator tail number N533BB) was used for a five-month demonstration tour across the Asia-Pacific region starting in May 2016 to showcase its capabilities to government and commercial customers.
It is noteworthy that among the key purposes and activities during its five-month demonstration tour were hot and high-altitude capabilities where performance is severely degraded by low air density, which reduces lift, engine power, and payload capacity. N533BB made landings at 15,200 ft in Nepal and on top of Mt. Apo (nearly 9,700 ft) in the Philippines.
The tour also targeted regional defense forces, with specific demonstrations for the Philippine Air Force at bases in Manila, Cebu, and Davao, highlighting utility, disaster relief, and search-and-rescue capabilities. Tours were made to various countries in Asia to demonstrate the aircraft’s suitability for oil and gas, law enforcement, and emergency medical services (EMS).
Editor, I perused Alert Services Bulletins specific to the Bell 412 EPI and observed the following which I will summarise for want of space. ASB 412-21-185 of July 15, 2021, identified corrosion on the tail rotor drive shaft assembly (412-040-620-103). ASB 412-00-100-RB related to concerns over inspection of the tailboom attachment cap angle (P/N 212-030-191-001) due to fatigue cracking.
Federal Aviation Administration 14 CFR Part 39 [Docket No. FAA–2018–0738; Product Identifier 2017–SW–132–AD; Amendment 39–19355; AD 2018–17–01] RIN 2120–AA64 superseded AD 2017–15–02 for Bell Model 212 and 412 helicopters. AD 2017–15–02 required replacing certain oil and fuel check valves and prohibited installing them on any helicopter.
These check valves may have had a condition induced during assembly that could cause the valve body to crack, resulting in oil or fuel leakage resulting in loss of lubrication or fuel to the engine, failure of the engine or a fire, and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter. To address this condition, AD 2017–15–02 required replacing the engine oil and fuel check valves and prohibited installing an affected check valve on any helicopter. The amendment was prompted by the discovery of an error in the affected models and became effective September 5, 2018.
ASB 412-21-187 of January 26, 2022, regarding 2021 maintenance, related to inspection of tailboom attachment bolt torque and barrel nut replacement. ASB 412-22-189 of September 28, 2022, related to potential fouling between the Garmin GTN 750 wiring harness and the panel assembly on 412EPI converted configurations. Technical Bulletin 412-16-236-RB of March 04, 2021, involved installing a new seal on the intermediate gearbox output quill assembly.
Information Letter 412-21-92 of November 15, 2021, emphasized passenger door window installation safety following reports of in-flight loss.
Effective November 18, 2020, the FAA adopted a new AD for Bell Textron Inc. Model 412, 412CF, and 412EP helicopters. This AD was prompted by an accident on a Model 412EP helicopter and multiple reports of a cracked main gearbox MGB support case. Initial investigations showed that excessive pylon pitch vibrations likely caused overload that resulted in these failures, and investigations were ongoing to determine the root cause of these vibrations.
Recent Airworthiness Directives (ADs) for Bell 412 helicopters (including 412EP, 412CF) focus on structural safety, specifically requiring the replacement of tail boom attachment barrel nuts with nickel alloy to prevent cracking (effective Nov 8, 2024). Other critical ADs address fatigue cracks in tailboom attachment cap angles, collective lever life limits due to fatigue, and main gearbox support case inspections.
Editor, regarding the participation of the National Transportation and Safety Board (NTSB). Under the Annex 13 process, this begins when NTSB is notified of the accident by the foreign state (Guyana). The state conducting the investigation will release their final report as soon as possible.
However, the state of occurrence (Guyana) is responsible for the investigation and controls the release of all information regarding the investigation; the NTSB will not release a report when the investigation is conducted by another authority. There is absolutely no need to publicise the nature and objective of the “military mission,” and we the Guyanese people understand the need for secrecy in that regard.
The answer as to whether the applicable ADs and ASBs were complied with, would go a fair way to – at the very least, a partial lifting of the clouds of doubt that hover over this entire affair and possibly dispel thoughts of mechanical malfunction caused by neglect.
The other two possible causes namely hostile weapons fire, which my intimate knowledge of my Guyanese people tells me would have been broadcast to the world under the circumstances; or pilot error which we are loath to consider, is a very real possibility that could turn on its head, the whole concept of heroism.
Yours truly,
Patrick E. Mentore
